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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“SURVIVORS” OF THE ETERNAL SEA: A SHORT TRUE STORY

JOSEPH J. SIMEONE*
“Good Skipper” use him truly,
For he is ill and sad
“Hush! Hush!” he cried, then cruelly
He kill’d the little lad.
BALLAD OF THE MIGNONETTE†
One of the more popular television shows last year was Survivor. Several
persons lived on a remote island and the last survivor won a million dollars.
The tale of the Mignonette is a real-life story of survivors who endured a
terrible ordeal on the eternal sea. It happened in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. Today, survivorship takes on a much broader spectrum.
Modern issues of life and death, whether in the form of abortion, partial-birth
abortion,1 euthanasia, the death penalty or violence in the schools have not
only captured the attention of our people, but have had a long and fascinating
history. A cultural war is currently being waged in our society. The divide
among its citizens is enormous: some believe all “life” should be greatly
respected, whether in the form of humans, other animals, or even plants; some
believe that life may be taken at some point and under certain circumstances.
The “twain,” unfortunately, shall never meet.
One such survivor story involving the value of human life is told in the
famous English decision, Regina v. Dudley and Stevens.2 The case involved
the taking of a human life, that of a young lad at sea, to save the lives of other
sailors who were stranded, without food and water, on the vast sea for many
days.

* B.S., J.D., LL.M., S.J.D.; Professor Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law.
†
The Ballad of the Mignonette is a folk ballad written originally by F. Morgans and reprinted at
A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW 253-54 (1984).
1. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a Nebraska partialbirth abortion statute). But see George Will, Opinion, Media Censoring the Tragedy of PartialBirth Abortion, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 21, 2000, at A10 (criticizing the media for refusing to run a
cartoon ad graphically depicting a late-term abortion).
2. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); 14 Q.B.D. 560 (1885).
1123

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1124

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1123

It is not only an important legal case, it is a fascinating adventure tale. It is
a tale that is not only very emotional when played out, but the story strains the
very legal and moral fabric of society—it would make a great movie—and it is
a modern tale because the principles embodied in that famous case are
applicable to our modern society.
What do men and women do to save themselves when faced with
impending death? How far will they go—how far can they go, legally and
morally? If they kill to save themselves, is it murder? These are some of the
same questions raised by the saga of the Mignonette, a small sailing ship, fiftytwo feet long, which sailed from England to Australia.3
I. THE MIGNONETTE
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was quite fashionable in
England to belong to a yachting club. It was, and still is, an English and
American tradition. In the 1880s, a nationally known yachting center was the
village of Tollesbury in Essex.4 Private yachts and yachting were symbols of
wealth, courage and success. Membership marked differences in social
structure. Queen Victoria and Prince Albert fostered such clubs, and to be a
member of the Royal squadron was the height of success. Many owners sailed
their own ships, while others hired professional crews with captains, or “sailor
masters.”
One of the many yachts in England during the 1880s was the Mignonette.
She was built in 1867 in Essex by the Aldhous brothers and launched August
12, 1867.5 The yachts built by the Aldhous brothers “were well known in the
racing world.”6 The ship was built mainly as a cruiser and fishing boat. It was
fifty-two feet long, twelve and one-half feet wide and seven feet, five inches
deep. She had a mainmast and a small mizzenmast aft. Her rig rose some
sixty feet above the deck, and she carried a small dinghy: thirteen feet long,
four feet wide and twenty inches deep.7
In 1883, the Mignonette was sold to a flamboyant Sydney lawyer by the
name of John Henry Want. Want was a member of the Royal Sunday Yacht
Squadron. “Jack” Want was a sporting man, “over six-foot in height, with a
rugged jaw and flashing eyes.”8 Jack Want came to England in 1883 to
purchase a “fast 40-ton yacht” to take back to Sydney. He bought the

3. The tale of the Mignonette is graphically and excellently told by Professor A.W. Brian
Simpson in his book CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW (1984). I have drawn upon his book
and give him full credit for certain portions of it.
4. See id. at 13.
5. See id. at 17.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 19.
8. See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 20.
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Mignonette and arranged for it to be sailed in the spring of 1884.9 Thomas
Riley Dudley, one of the principals of our story, was hired to sail the vessel
back to Sydney.
Tom Dudley was born on April 14, 1853 at Tollesbury, the son of George
and Susannah Carter Dudley. Tom’s mother died when he was six. When
Tom was about ten years old, his life began at sea. He signed on as a boy on
the Royal Charter on which he worked for nearly six years. When he was
sixteen, he joined the schooner Iris, ultimately working as an able seaman. He
soon earned a reputation for courage and seamanship.10
Tom Dudley was a short man with reddish hair and a beard. He spoke
with a broad Essex accent. He was an experienced, courageous seaman. One
newspaper described him as “possessing the character of a bold and fearless
man . . . much sought after by owners of yachts.”11 It was no wonder, then,
that Tom Dudley was drawn to sailing the Mignonette to Sydney. The terms of
the contract between Tom Dudley and Jack Want were generous, and there was
a possibility that, in Sydney, Tom would be the captain of Jack Want’s new
yacht.
In May 1884, at Southampton, the Mignonette was repaired and outfitted
for the long, 16,000-mile journey to Sydney. Tom sought a crew of three and
signed James Robert Haynes, Edmund (Ned) Brooks, age thirty-nine, and
Richard Parker, age seventeen.12 On May 15, 1884, Tom went with the three
men to the customs house and signed the ship’s articles. Haynes was an
experienced sailor with a mate’s certificate who had apparently known Dudley
before signing. Ultimately, however, Haynes had a change of heart and
deserted the ship the next day.
To replace Haynes, Dudley signed Edwin Stephens. Stephens was born in
1847, was thirty-seven at the time of sailing and lived in Southampton.
Stephens went to sea at fourteen as a “boy.” He became a seaman in 1863 and
a master mariner in 1876. Stephens’ career was a rocky one, especially after a
sea disaster while serving on the European of Africa. He had difficulty
locating a position in England. He was tempted into signing by Dudley’s offer
to make him the captain of the Mignonette in Sydney.13
Edmund James Brooks, known as “Ned,” “Neddy” or “Teddy,” was born
May 18, 1846. He, too, went to sea at an early age, became a yacht hand and
had known Tom Dudley for several years. He had worked on racing vessels.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 21.
See id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
See id. at 30.
See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 35.
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Rumors indicated that he had been married but that he deserted his wife. The
trip to Sydney with Dudley may have been his escape.14
Richard Thomas Parker was born the year the Mignonette was built—
1867. Known as “Little Dickey,” he was the son of “Old Chick” Parker, a
yacht skipper, and Mary Parker. Richard was young when his father died, and
he and his two older brothers had to fend for themselves. Richard was
illiterate; he could not sign the ship’s articles, but loved to travel, and he joined
the Dudley crew to go to Sydney when he was seventeen years old. He signed
on, allegedly for £1 a week.15
In May 1884, the crew was set. On Monday, May 19, 1884, they set out
from a village near Southampton. The voyage was to be a long one—between
14,000 and 16,000 miles around the Cape of Good Hope.16 Dudley decided to
sail first to Madeira and pass close to the Cape Verde Islands. After a short
stop at Madeira he would sail on to Cape Town and then to Sydney. In
following this route, Dudley followed other captains who sailed small
vessels.17 Tom Dudley and Edwin Stephens, the navigator, hoped to reach
Sydney in 110 or 120 days. May 22, 1884, was their last sight of the English
shore. On June 1, they reached Madeira. There, they took on water, fruit,
meat, vegetables and fish. They left Madeira on June 2. On June 17, they
crossed the equator and moved thereafter into the South Atlantic, where winter
comes early. They expected strong winds and seas. On July 3, the vessel lay
in the eye of a severe storm. By July 5, they were in heavy cross-seas.
On that fateful day, Dudley, according to his own account, “saw a very
high sea about to brake [sic] over us” and heard the mate cry out that “her side
[was] knocked in and she [was] sinking.”18 Stephens later recalled crying out,
“My God! Her topsides are stove in; she is sinking.”19 Dudley gave orders to
lower the dinghy. Parker got some water from the Mignonette, but had to
throw half the cask overboard because lowering it into the dinghy would have
been too risky. Dudley, as captain, was the last man aboard; he obtained the
sextant and chronometer, and descended into the cabin below. He threw tins of
food toward the dinghy, but only two cans of turnips were obtained. Stephens,
Brooks and Parker called out to Dudley to “[c]ome up, Captain!”20 Dudley got
into the dinghy and, within five minutes, the Mignonette sank, sending three
men and a boy out into the open sea.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 36.
Id. at 37-38.
See id. at 40.
See id. at 41.
See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
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II. THE ORDEAL
The sea was raging. Able seamen that they were, the four castaways
righted the dinghy, brought its head toward the sea, and rode out the storm.
The men never recovered the cask of water; all that remained on board were
the sextant, the chronometer and two tins of turnips. Dudley described the
awful scene:
[I]t was a very bad sea like a mountain at times and water coming in faster than
we could bail it out and night was coming on . . . we had only one [bailer] on
board . . . about 11 p.m. I should think by the moon a large shark came
knocking his tail against our frail boat which made me think our time was near
for him to be dining off our bodis [sic] but I prayed that we might be speared
[sic] to see all at home if possible live a better life in the future.21

The dark night came; the dinghy was tumbled to and fro, and the men
prayed. They were some 1600 miles southeast of the Cape of Good Hope, and
some 700 miles from the nearest islands. Dudley surveyed the scene. “Men,
let us get on our knees and pray.” The three men and Parker knelt. “Oh, God
and Lord, take us this through this ordeal. We have nothing to sustain us, no
water and two tins of turnips. With Thy help, we will be rescued.”22
When dawn broke on Sunday, July 6, they assessed the situation. They
had no water, little food, an oar and an improvised anchor. That day, the sea
calmed; the wind veered to the southeast. Dudley scribbled a note to his wife
that read, “Mignonette foundered yesterday. Weather knocked side in. We
had five minutes to get in boat without food or water.”23 Dudley asked the
men for their shirts. A makeshift sail was made. The first day was spent
sailing a calm sea.
Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday came and went. Dudley rationed the
two tins of turnips. A rain shower came, and the men caught water in their
clothing. During the middle of the week, Dudley spotted a turtle. Stephens
bent over the Dinghy and grabbed it by the fins and drew it in the boat.
Brooks, the cook, was elated. “I can tell you,” he said, “we were very pleased
with the prospect of having something to eat, and you can have nothing better
at sea in the shape of a fish than a turtle.”24 When the turtle was pulled into the
dinghy, the captain killed it with his pocketknife. They caught the blood in the
chronometer cases. Dudley cut the turtle into small strips and hung them
around the dinghy to dry. They lived on the turtle for days—eating the bones
and chewing at its skin. Between the turtle and rationing the turnips, they
managed to survive through July 17. Their water, however, was gone. They
began to drink their own urine. Their lips and tongues were parched and black;
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 50.
SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 56.
Id. at 57.
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their feet and legs were swollen; their skin developed sores.25 By July 16, the
remains of the turtle were gone—there was no food, and the castaways became
desperate. The lad, Richard Parker, began drinking seawater. On the night of
July 20, he drank a large quantity of it. He became ill. He lay groaning and
gasping. He became delirious and then comatose.26 The three men comforted
the lad. “Cheer up, Dickey, it will come out all right,” said Brooks.27 By now
the men knew that Richard was not long for the world. Hope began to fade.
On July 21, Dudley wrote what he thought to be his farewell letter to his wife:
We have been here 17 [sic] days; have no food, we are all four living, hoping
to get a passing ship. If not we must soon die . . . . I am sorry, dear, I ever
started on such a trip, but it was doing it for our best . . . . I should so like to be
spared. You would find I should live a Christian life for the rest of my days.
If this note ever reaches your hands, you know the last of your Tom and loving
husband . . . . Goodbye and God bless you . . . . Your loving husband,
Tom . . . .28

On that same day, Parker was very ill and even commented, “We shall die.”29
Although he had thought about it for some time, perhaps as early as July
16 or 17, Dudley brought up the issue of drawing lots to determine who should
die so that the others might be saved. “We shall have to draw lots, boys.” But
the unanimous response was, “No, we had better die together.”30 Brooks was
always against drawing lots to determine who should die to save the others.
The matter was dropped. Later, Tom raised the question of drawing lots again.
Parker was lying in the bottom of the boat, groaning but not moving. Dudley
said, “[I]f three of us are to live, one has to die.”31 But Brooks and Stephens
demurred, “We shall see a ship tomorrow.”32 Dudley persisted on drawing
lots. Brooks refused, but Stephens concurred. During that night, while Brooks
was steering, Dudley asked Stephens, “What is to be done? I believe the boy is
dying. You have a wife and five children, and I have a wife and three children.
Human flesh has been eaten before.”33 Stephens said, “See what the daylight
brings forth.”34
At dawn, Stephens relieved Brooks at the helm. No sail or ship was in
sight. Then, both Dudley and Stephens made a pact whereby Richard, who
was at the time lying in the bottom of the boat with his arm over his face, was
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 58.
See id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61.
DONALD MCCORMICK, BLOOD ON THE SEA 57 (1962).
SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 62.
Id.
Id.
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to be killed. Brooks was told by Tom Dudley, “You had better go forward and
have a sleep.”35
Parker gasped for breath. About 8:00 a.m., July 24, Dudley looked around;
nothing was to be seen on the open sea. He told Stephens to be ready to hold
Richard’s legs if he struggled. In Dudley’s own words, this is what happened
next:
No vessel appearing on the morning, I made signs to Stephens and Brooks that
we had better do it, but they seemed to have no heart to do it, so I went to the
boy, who was lying at the bottom of the boat with his arm over his face. I took
out my knife—first offering a prayer to God to forgive us for what we were
about to do and for the rash act, that our souls might be saved—and I said to
the boy, ‘Richard, your time has come.’ The boy said, ‘What me, Sir?’ I said,
‘Yes, my boy.’ I then put my knife [into the side of his neck.] The blood
spurted out, and we caught it in the bailer and we drank the blood while it was
warm; we then stripped the body, cut it open, and took out his liver and heart,
and we ate the liver while it was still warm. Stephens at that time was in the
stern of the boat and Brooks in the bow.36

They drank the blood and ate the heart and liver. During the next few hours,
Richard’s body was dismembered, using the dinghy’s brass oar locks. Brooks
later described the scene as “a horrible sight and no mistake.”37 Dudley talked
about the scene, “I can assure you I shall never forget the sight of my two
companions over that ghastly meal . . . we was all like mad [sic] wolfs.”38
The men lived on Parker’s body for four days; Dudley and Brooks
consumed most of the carcass, Stephens very little of it. Dudley was quite
convinced that this had saved their lives. They were now stronger and quite
different men.
On the morning of Tuesday, July 29, a sail was sighted. According to
Dudley, “[O]n the 24th day as we was having our breakfast we will call it[,]
Brooks who was steering shouted a sail true . . . a sail it was we all
prayed . . . .”39
It was about 6:30 a.m. and Brooks shouted, “Oh, my God, here’s a ship
coming straight towards us.”40 Stephens waved a shirt. The ship saw them.
Dudley shouted, “[F]or God’s sake help us . . . . Help us on board.”41 The
rescue ship was the sailing ship Moctezuma, a 442 ton ship on a return voyage
from Chile. When the ship came close enough, the captain of the vessel, P.H.
Simonsen, a German, spoke to them in his native tongue. He sent two of his
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 63.
Queen v. Dudley and Others, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 1 T.L.R. 29, 30 (1884).
SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
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crew down to help the three men in the dinghy. Dudley and Stephens were
hauled up by ropes. They were wrapped, given a small glass of water, brandy
and food. As the men were being rescued from the dinghy, it still contained
the remains of Richard Parker—some ribs and a few pieces of flesh.42
The men were treated with kindness, and their respective conditions—
swollen feet, emaciated bodies, blackened mouths and lips, and skin sores—
were treated. The day after the rescue, Tom Dudley suffered a strange mishap.
While he was sitting on a chamber pot relieving himself, the pot shattered and
lacerated his buttocks so severely that he had to stand for some period of time.
The Moctezuma arrived at Falmouth in England on September 5, 1884. At
the time, Falmouth was a seaport with some 11,000 inhabitants. When the
sailors arrived, Tom Dudley voluntarily told the customs officials that he had
killed Parker, and word of the sailors’ plight spread like wildfire throughout
the English countryside. The men were regarded as heroes for what they went
through. The Falmouth mayor and other officials contacted London on what
should be done. Despite Dudley’s insistence that he was the ringleader and
that Brooks and Stephens were innocent, all three sailors were arrested.43
III. THE PRELIMINARY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Once the three were arrested, they were brought before the Falmouth
borough Magistrates. This was a preliminary inquiry to determine whether
charges against the men should be proceeded with or whether the men should
be set free. Tom Dudley was quite optimistic that he and the others would be
freed for, after all, he had saved three lives at the expense of one who was, for
all practical purposes, dead.44
The three men appeared before the mayor and his colleagues on the bench
and were charged with murder. The penknife used in the killing was
introduced. Defense counsel, Harry Tilly, pointed out how the men had
cooperated, as they had hidden nothing, and he emphasized their weakness of
body and confusion of mind during the ordeal. The defense was carefully
considered, but the judges eventually held the men in custody for a further
hearing.
In London, meanwhile, judicial wheels were spinning. The Home
Secretary discussed the case with legal officers of the Queen, the attorney
general and the solicitor general. The Home Secretary concluded, “This is a
very dreadful case. The law must decide what is the character of this terrible
act. I presume these men will [be held for trial.] I should wish the Public

42. See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 70-71.
43. See MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 78-79.
44. See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 74.
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Prosecutor to take charge of the case so that it may be properly dealt with.”45
Appropriate memoranda were sent to the Prosecutor.
Later, the three prisoners again appeared in court. There was a great
crowd, as the courthouse was “densely packed.”46 Daniel Parker, Richard’s
older brother, was in the courtroom. Counsel for Dudley, Stephens and Brooks
made application for bail. Counsel urged the judges to consider “the great
universal principle of self-preservation which prompts every man to save his
own life preferably to that of another.”47 He supported his argument by citing
Sir Francis Bacon, Sir William Blackstone and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, a
great English judge and author of the History of the Criminal Law of
England.48
The magistrate granted bail, even though murder was a capital offense, and
the crowd applauded. Dudley was released on £200 bail, and the other two at
half that amount. John Burton, a local character, stood as surety for the three
men. Thus, all three were now free on bail.
The townspeople were delighted, as public opinion was in favor of the
three “heroes.” A special benefit night was arranged to raise money. The
dinghy with its bloodstains was exhibited in the town. Newspaper editorials
were favorable toward the men. The local news editorialized, “It is utterly
impossible that men can endure the tortures of nineteen days’ starvation, the
exquisite agony of a long continuing thirst, the anguish of mind and the
prospect of excruciating death . . . without the mind becoming in a measure at
least deranged; and without thus becoming to the fullest extent irresponsible
for their actions.”49 Newspapers also printed Tom’s letter to his wife that he
had written in the dinghy.
By now, the “Terrible Tale of the Sea” was filling the world’s press.50
Ballads were written and sold to raise money for their defense. Mementos of
the dinghy were displayed. Yacht clubs also raised money for their defense.
But, notwithstanding, the prosecution proceeded. The prosecution was
placed in the hands of William Danckwerts, a young barrister of the Inner
Temple. He faced some formidable obstacles and needed a witness for the
prosecution. Dudley, Stephens and Brooks were the only eyewitnesses to the
event. He concluded that one of them must be used by the Crown. The
prosecutor chose the obvious one, Brooks, who took no active part in the
killing of Parker.

45. Id. at 77.
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 80.
48. Id. at 81.
49. SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 81 (citing a long editorial in Lake’s Falmouth Packet and
Cornwall Advertiser (Sept. 13, 1884)).
50. Id. at 83.
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In his opening case before the magistrates, he announced his intention to
have Brooks be a witness for the Crown, and asked the Court to dismiss all
charges against him. The Court acquiesced in dismissing the charges against
Brooks. The decision was met with an outburst of applause. “I must ask the
public to suppress their feelings either way, or I must order the court to be
cleared,” said the presiding chairman.51 The prosecutor also called two of the
sailors of the Moctezuma and a Board of Trade official at Falmouth as
witnesses.
The judges then bound the prisoners over for trial, at Exeter, at the next
term of court before a judge and jury. In due time it was announced that the
trial would be held in November before Baron Huddleston. Arthur Charles,
Queens Counsel (Q.C.) was to prosecute for the Crown, and Henry Clark was
to represent the defendants.52
IV. THE TRIAL
On October 28, 1884, less than two months after the Moctezuma brought
the sailors to Falmouth, the Times announced that the trial would begin on
November 1 at Exeter.53 The trial judge, Baron Huddleston, was a very
colorful individual. A clerk of the court commented that the Baron was in the
habit of wearing gloves in court—”black gloves for murder, lavender for
breach of promise and white for conventional cases.”54 The real reason the
judge probably wore gloves, as was the reason why judges sat in high top
rounded chairs, was simply because English courtrooms were cold. He was
known as a “strong judge.”55 Prior to becoming a judge, he had a successful
criminal law practice. In 1875 he became judge of the Court of Common Pleas
and later served on the Court of Exchequer, becoming Baron just before the
English Procedural Judicature Acts (1873-76).56
The trial took place on November 6, 1884 in the Courtroom in Exeter
castle. Exeter was buzzing, and a considerable crowd gathered for the trial.
Seating was by ticket only.
The prosecution opened with a statement by Arthur Charles, Q.C. Mr.
Charles began by expressing the deepest sympathy for Dudley and Stephens.
He told the jury that
considerations of compassion and sympathy might well justify a favorable plea
for the remission of the extreme [death] penalty of the law; but it could not be
allowed to interfere with the performance of their duty, or prevent their finding

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 91.
See id. at 93.
Ultimately, however, the trial was continued until Monday, November 3.
SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 196.
Id.
Id.
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these men guilty of murder . . . if [the defendants’] crime amounted to murder
by the law of England.57

Mr. Charles repeated the facts of the charge in the indictment. Dudley, age
thirty-one, Stephens, age thirty-six, Brooks, age thirty-eight and Parker, age
seventeen, were adrift. He told them that there were traces of the crime in the
dinghy, and that statements had been made by Dudley and Stephens. He
argued that the question to be determined as far as he could tell, could only be
answered one way. “Murder [is] the unlawful killing of anyone by a person of
sound mind, with malice aforethought.
Malice aforethought implied
deliberation and intention, not spite or anger, and in this case it was evident
that the act was committed deliberately and after full consideration.”58
Mr. Charles first argued that the “McNaghten Rules”—those that require a
guilty defendant know the difference between right and wrong—would not
apply.59 Charles then turned to the principles of justifiable and excusable
homicide. He argued:
No doubt such cases were known to the English law, but there was no trace of
any circumstance which would warrant such a conclusion in this case . . . .
The law allows a man to kill his assailant in order to prevent himself from
being killed, but in this case, these men ran no danger at Parker’s hands.60

Mr. Charles relied on Blackstone—”that when assailed a man ought rather
to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent.”61 The issue of two
men on a plank had never been determined by law, but in any event that was
not the situation here. He referred to the previous cases of drawing lots, and
the proposed argument that a man selected and killed by lot would absolve the
survivors of murder, but contended he could find no authoritative case, nor
“anything to show that that was the law of [England.]”62 He asked the jury for
a special verdict on the facts so that points of law could be settled on review by
the court above.
The prosecution evidence presented by the Crown proceeded. The
statements made by Dudley and Stephens at Falmouth were introduced;
Brooks testified as to the facts as an eyewitness and “gave evidence as to the
57. Queen v. Dudley and Others, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 1 T.L.R. 29, 32 (1884).
58. Id.
59. See SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 206. The McNaghten Rules were “laid down by judges in
answer to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in 1843 in connection with the trial of
one Daniel McNaghten.” Id. The rules permitted a defense of insanity, but only if it could be
shown either that the defendants “had not known what they were doing at all or had not known
that what they did was ‘wrong.’” Id. Dudley and Stephens’ own statements ruled out the former
claim, and “the fact that Dudley had admitted to saying a prayer for forgiveness was relied on to
show that he knew what he did was ‘wrong.’” Id.
60. Queen v. Dudley and Others, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 1 T.L.R. 29, 32 (1884).
61. Id. at 32-33.
62. Id. at 33.
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terrible sufferings they all endured.”63 He stated that at the time the deed was
done he considered that there was no reasonable prospect of relief coming to
them. Testimony was also given by some of the members of the Moctezuma,
but Ned Brooks was the star. When asked, “[w]hen this all took place about
casting lots, what did you say?,” he replied, “I said, ‘Let us all die together. I
should not like anyone to kill me, and I should not like to kill anyone else.’”64
After Mr. Charles made his opening, Baron Huddleston turned to defense
counsel, Arthur Collins. He said, “Mr. Collins, I presume you traverse the law
[meaning, disagree with the view of the Crown]?”65 Collins replied that he did
and relied on the cases of necessity in the Report of the Criminal Law
Commissioners. Huddleston replied that he would lay down as a matter of law
that there was no justification and said, “I shall lay that down distinctly and
absolutely.”66 Collins replied that he would address the jury “upon my view of
the case.”67 He then gave his argument.
Collins began by reminding the jury no “[g]overnement of any civilized
country had in any case prosecuted the unhappy survivors on a charge of
murder.”68 He contended that the facts were clear; that the defendants were
respectable, God-fearing men and “had been driven by the direst straits to do
that which was utterly repulsive and abhorrent to their minds in order to save
their lives.”69 He contended that, under the evidence, there was an “inevitable
necessity that one life should be sacrificed in order that the other three might
be saved, and that they were justified in so doing in selecting the weakest.”70
He concluded by saying that “these men, on their return to this country, did not
dream that they had committed any criminal offense in doing, under the
circumstances of the most awful peril, that which had undoubtedly saved their
lives.”71 Collins never suggested that the defendants should be completely
excused, only that the crime was not murder, but manslaughter, a reduced
offense.
Baron Huddleston then summed up and charged the jury. He told them
that they were bound “to accept the law of the land as laid down by him, and
were not at liberty to disregard his ruling, though invited to do so by the
learned counsel for the defense.”72 He asked them to return a special verdict,
meaning, a procedure commonly used at the time to ensure that the case would

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 210.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Queen v. Dudley and Others, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 1 T.L.R. 29, 33 (1884) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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be reviewed by a higher court. He said that, although counsel for the defense
contended that the law of necessity would justify such a deed, he “felt bound to
say that on all grounds of law or morality[, I dissent] from that argument . . . .
There was no such doctrine in the law any more than that necessity was a
justification for theft, though it might be a very good reason for imploring the
clemency of the Crown.”73
The jurors retired and deliberated. They returned a special verdict and
expressed their strong “expression of sympathy and compassion for the
sufferings the prisoners had undergone . . . .”74 The special verdict, curiously
enough, was drafted by Baron Huddleston. The special verdict was intended to
become the definitive account of the facts on which the guilt or innocence of
Dudley and Stephens turned. Also, curiously, the special verdict contained no
finding as to whether it was “necessary” to sacrifice the life of Richard Parker.
The special verdict recited the facts and found:
If the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably not have
survived to be picked up and rescued . . . . [A]ssuming any necessity to kill
anybody, there was no greater necessity for killing the boy than any of the
other three men; but whether upon the whole matter, [the killing of the said
Richard Parker be felony and murder or not,] the jury are ignorant and refer to
the court.”75

Thus ended the trial. Dudley and Stephens were freed on bail, pending the
legal review.
V. THE APPEAL
On December 4th and 9th, the case was argued and decided before an
expanded panel of judges consisting of Lord Coleridge, Chief Justice Grove,
and Judges Denman, Pollock and the trial judge Baron Huddleston. Dudley
and Stephens came to London.
On the appeal, Mr. Collins for the defense first contended that there was
really no finding by the jury of “guilty” or “not guilty.” The Attorney General,
Sir Henry James, argued otherwise and relied upon specific authority. Lord
Coleridge stated that the cases cited were “wholly immaterial,” and “mere
form.”76 After the argument of the Attorney General, Lord Coleridge said,
“The proposition that this is not murder is so entirely novel . . . that we think
we had better hear what Mr. Collins has to say upon the point.”77 Collins
argued for reliance on the case referred to in the medical work of Nicolas
Tulpius, a Dutch writer, in which several seamen were stranded, cast lots to see
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Queen v. Dudley and Others, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 1 T.L.R. 29, 33 (1884).
Id. at 34.
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 560, 52 L.T.R. 107, 109 (1885).
Id.
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who would be sacrificed, and subsequently were “treated with kindness by the
Dutch and sent home to St. Christopher.”78 Collins argued that the English law
did recognize a defense of necessity that applied to the facts and which
justified or excused the killing of Parker. It was with this contention that the
Court was mainly concerned, and the case has ever since been known to deal
with the principle of necessity in English and American law. Surprisingly,
after Collins’ statement, Lord Coleridge commented, “We need not trouble
you, Mr. Attorney-General to reply, as we are all of opinion that the prisoners
must be convicted.”79 The Attorney General then suggested that it was proper
for the court to pronounce sentence.
Five days after the argument, the opinion and judgment of the court was
handed down by the Chief Justice Lord Coleridge. After stating the facts,
reciting the special verdict, and disposing of several procedural issues, the
Chief Justice discussed the merits of the case. The Chief Justice stated, “There
remains to be considered the real question in the case, whether killing, under
the circumstances set forth in the [special] verdict, be or be not murder.”80 “It
is said,” he continued, that from “various definitions of murder . . . that, in
order to save your own life you may lawfully take away the life of another,
when the other is neither attempting nor threatening yours. But if these
definitions are looked at, they will not be found to sustain the contention.”81
Lord Coleridge then examined the early English authorities. Bracton, who
wrote in the time of Henry III, spoke of necessity. But “in the very passage as
to necessity, on which reliance has been placed, it is clear that Bracton is
speaking of necessity in the ordinary sense, the repelling of violence . . . .”82
The defendants’ contention was not supported by Lord Hale—”the great
authority.”83 In Hales’ view it was plain that
necessity which justifies homicide is that only which has always been, and is
now, considered a justification . . . . Necessity which justifies homicide . . . is
of two kinds: “(1) [t]hat necessity which is of a private nature; (2) [t]hat
necessity which relates to the public justice and safety. The former is that
which obligates a man to his own defence and safeguard . . . .” It is not
possible to use words more clear to show that Lord Hale regarded the private
necessity which justified, and alone justified, the taking the life of another for
the safeguard of one’s own to be what is commonly called self-defence.84

Lord Coleridge analogized to the law of England which holds that “if a person,
being under necessity for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon that
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 109 n.(a).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 560, 52 L.T.R. 107, 111 (1885).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 1 HALE P.C. 478).
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account . . . steal another man’s goods, it is a felony and a crime by the laws of
England punishable with death.”85 Lord Coleridge reviewed other English
authorities—Sir Michael Foster’s Discourse on Homicide, Sir Edward East and
Lord Russell—and concluded that no authority justified the deed committed by
Dudley and Stephens. “Decided cases there are none.”86 He stated that the
American case, United States v. Holmes,87 in which sailors were found guilty
for throwing passengers overboard to save others, was correctly decided. The
one authority of former times, Lord Bacon, said in his Commentary that
necessity is of “three sorts: necessity of conservation of life, necessity of
obedience and necessity of the act of God.”88 But these comments had not
been approved. If Lord Bacon meant “to lay down the broad proposition that a
man may save his life by killing an innocent and unoffending neighbor, it
certainly is not law at the present day . . . . [There was] no excuse in this case
unless the killing was justified by what has been called necessity.”89 Lord
Coleridge then, in his opinion, concluded with some beautiful prose:
Though law and morality are not the same and though many things may be
immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from
morality would be of fatal consequence, and such divorce would follow if the
temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defense of
it. It is not so. To preserve one’s life is generally speaking, a duty, but it may
be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in
which it is a man’s duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in this case a
shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, or soldiers to
women and children . . . imposes on men the moral necessity, not of the
preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others, from which in no
country—least of all England—will men ever shrink . . . . It would be a very
easy and cheap display of common-place learning to quote from Greek and
Latin authors—from Horace, from Juvenal, from Cicero, from Euripides—
passage after passage in which the duty of dying for others has been laid down
in glowing and emphatic language as resulting from the principles of heathen
ethics. It is enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great
Example which we profess to follow . . . . Was it more necessary to kill him
than one of the grown men? The answer must be, No . . . . [I]t is quite plain
that such a principle, once admitted, might be made the legal cloke for
unbridled passion and atrocious crime . . . . [A] man has no right to declare
temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor
allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the
legal definition of the crime. It is therefore our duty to declare that the
prisoners’ act in this case was wilful murder; that the facts as stated in the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. (citing 1 HALE P.C. 54).
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 560, 52 L.T.R. 107, 112 (1885).
26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842).
Regina, 14 Q.B.D. 560, L.T.R. 107, 112 (1885).
Id.
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verdict are no legal justification of the homicide; and to say that, in our
unanimous opinion, they are, upon this special verdict, guilty of murder.90

After the opinion was read and handed down, Sir Henry James, the
Attorney General, prayed the court that the sentences be imposed upon Dudley
and Stephens. Dudley and Stephens were called to the bench and Lord
Coleridge spoke, “You have been convicted of murder. What have you to say
why the Court should not give you judgment to die?”91 In a low voice, Dudley
said, “I throw myself on the mercy of the court.”92 Lord Coleridge took the
unusual action of not downing his black cap, then passed sentence on Dudley
and Stephens, intoning:
You have been convicted of the crime of wilful murder, though you have been
recommended by the jury most earnestly to the mercy of the Crown; a
recommendation in which, as I understand, my learned brother who tried you
concurs, and in which we all unanimously concur. It is my duty, however, as
the organ of the Court, to pronounce on you the sentence of the law, and that
sentence is that to the crime of which you have been convicted, you be taken to
the prison where you came, and that, on a day appointed for the purpose of
your execution you there be hanged by the neck until you be dead.93

VI. THE AFTERMATH
The story does not end there. Although Dudley and Stephens were
condemned men, popular opinion was in their favor. It had always been
thought, throughout the trial proceedings, that if they were convicted, a pardon
would be sought and granted. Soon after the trial, London solicitors sent to the
Home Office a “massive engrossed petition” entitled “The Humble Petition of
Thomas Dudley late Master and Edward [sic] Stephens late Mate of the Yacht
Mignonette.”94 The Petition was received in the Home Office. The Home
Office decided that the sentence should be commuted to six months
imprisonment, but “not at hard labor.”95 Dudley and Stephens received the
news the next day. Law and justice were thus both satisfied. On May 20,
1885, Dudley and Stephens were released from prison, a year and a day after
the voyage of the Mignonette began.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE IN TODAY’S WORLD
First, the significance of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens lies in the fact that
the English courts, for the first time, decisively and absolutely laid down the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 113 (emphasis in original).
Queen v. Dudley and Another, 1 T.L.R. 118, 128 (1884).
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Queen v. Dudley and Another, 52 L.T.R. 107, 113 (1885).
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common-law, civilized principle that life is very precious; that human life is to
be protected at all costs except for the traditional defenses of justification and
excuse, and that the defense of necessity is no excuse; that life shall not, under
such circumstances, be taken or sacrificed even to preserve one’s own life.
That is a great civilizing principle. This decision exemplifies the dichotomy
between murder and manslaughter which goes back to the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries.96 The decision also repudiated the doctrine of “necessity”
in cases such as this.97
The common law, by this decision, adhered to and approved the words of
Shakespeare:
What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties!
in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel!
in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of
animals!98

But in these days of modern society, that civilizing principle laid down in
Dudley—that all human life is precious, and that the law must, with mercy,
punish the taking of any human life—is being weakened, ignored, and turned
upside down.
Witness the present social scene. Millions of abortions, committed in the
name of women’s rights, occur each year.99 The death penalty is being eroded
each day, as groups clamor for its abolition, even though heinous murders and
other felonies occur that damage the lives of not only the victims but their
families as well. Those who deliberately take a life forfeit the right to life, yet
demonstrations occur whenever a convicted murderer is to be executed.100 Dr.
Death (Dr. Kevorkian) has, in the name of mercy, “killed” several poor souls

96. See the excellent discussion of the distinction between murder and manslaughter in
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 305 (1850).
97. Today the defense of “necessity” has been used, unsuccessfully, in many cases of
abortion. See People v. Alderson, 540 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1989); State v. O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (opinion by Simeone, J.); State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986).
98. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2.
99. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See also the Jewish faith’s policy on abortion. The reasoning behind the Jewish rulings of no
abortion (except to save the mother’s life) is that a man may not destroy life—even potential life.
As was seen with euthanasia, just as every part of a life has value, so even a person cannot say
that it is his or her life to do with as he or she pleases. Since life belongs to God, a potential
mother cannot say it is her fetus to do with as she wishes. The potential life also belongs to God
and not just to the mother. See NACHUM AMSEL, THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES (1993).
100. As in the case of Gary Graham in Texas. The actual case and the brutality of the crime,
however, tell a different tale. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); State ex rel. Holmes
v. Texas Bd. of Pardons, 860 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. 1993); Graham v. State, 671 S.W.2d 529
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Graham v. Johnson, 45 F. Supp.2d 555 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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without ever receiving any severe punishment. Older, senior citizens and
others are now deciding when to die, that is, when life is no longer bearable.101
Genocides occur in Rwanda and other third-world nations. School shootings,
by even young children, are becoming ordinary. Movies and computer games
show how to kill.102
In all this, life and the respect for life are being eroded in our modern
society; life is cheapened—a far cry from the civilizing principles laid down in
Dudley.
It is not hard to see the future. Life will continue to be less important—
there may well come a day when the movie Soylent Green103 becomes reality:
in a world where old go to die in a beautiful setting, and their bodies are made
into cookies to feed the young; in a world where groups, such as Jews,
Catholics, Democrats or Republicans, can be done away with impunity. It has
happened in our lifetime—who is to say that it will, under the present trend,
not happen again!
Secondly, the Dudley decision places strict limits on the doctrine of
“necessity.” One cannot take another’s life, even to preserve his or her own,
except in cases of justifiable or excusable homicide, as those terms have been
used throughout the centuries of the common law. That is how strong the
common law viewed, for centuries, the high value of human life.
The defense of “necessity” to a criminal offense in the law of England and
America has had a long and controversial history. While the defense was used
in a very few circumstances, until recently the defense has lain dormant in the
law. The principle in Dudley was whether the defense of necessity was
available in circumstances where life was taken in order to preserve another’s
life. In the modern context, in this, the early twenty-first century, the doctrine
of necessity which has sprung anew in numerous cases centers on whether the
defense is available to preserve life—not sacrifice it. The principle is raised
today in numerous cases involving the emotionally charged and politically
divisive issue of abortion. Is the defense available to persons charged with
criminal trespass arising out of protestors’ attempts to halt the carrying out of
abortions performed at an abortion clinic?
The defense of “necessity” is a justification defense. It is an affirmative
defense which is often expressed in terms of a “choice of evils.” “When the
pressure of circumstances presents a person with a choice of evils, the law
prefers that the person ‘avoid the greater evil by bringing about the lesser

101. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408
(Mo. 1988).
102. See Editorial, A Poisonous Pleasure, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 30, 2000, at B2
(stating that “media violence is hazardous to our health” and that “we want relief”).
103. Soylent Green (1973) (starring Edward G. Robinson, and Charlton Heston).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

“SURVIVORS” OF THE ETERNAL SEA

1141

evil.’”104 Thus, conduct which would otherwise be a crime is, under the
pressure of circumstances, the lesser of two evils.105
The defense of necessity has long been recognized in the common law. At
common law, the necessity defense was a social policy that recognized that
individuals should be free from legal restraint “where physical forces beyond
the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”106
The requirements for the successful use of the defense have been stated
many times and in various ways in judicial decisions. Generally, the criteria
have been that: (1) the act charged must have been done to prevent a
significant imminent harm; (2) there must have been no adequate alternative;
and (3) the harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the harm
avoided, or, to put the matter another way, the harm to be avoided must be
greatly disproportionate to the harm caused.107 In addition, the requirements
that the defendant have a reasonable, objective belief in the urgency of the
illegal conduct and that the threatened harm must arise through no fault of the
defendant are essential.
Crucial to the application of the doctrine are the imminence of the danger
and the existence of an emergency situation. One court stated:
[T]he application of the defense [of necessity] is limited to the following
circumstances: (1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or; (2) the defendant can reasonably expect that his
action will be effective as the direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no
legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the
legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate
choice regarding the values at issue.108

In a New York case,109 the court discussed the issue:
[T]he necessity defense cannot be used to “excuse criminal activity intended to
express the protestor’s disagreement with positions reached by the lawmaking
branches of the government.” . . . It is not for the courts to decide if an
appropriate decision was made by the legislative or executive branches, among
competing policy options. To extend the defense this far would violate the
principle of separation of powers.110

This defense cannot be used even to save one’s life at the expense of another.
Life has always been, under the common law, precious. Cheapening it under
our modern pressures and principles of morality is incompatible with centuries
104. St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
105. See Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal
Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974).
106. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1975).
107. State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
108. Id.
109. People v. Alderson, 540 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1989).
110. Id. at 955 (quoting United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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of the common law. Thus, the Dudley case has important implications for
today’s society. A return to those principles would be greatly beneficial.
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Appendix
The Importance of a Trial and a Decision in Dudley
Why was it that a trial was held in the case of Dudley and Stephens?
Public opinion was strongly in favor of these two sailors. They were “heroes”
in the eyes of the “man on the street.” But a great principle was at stake: when,
and under what circumstances, might one take the life of another in the eyes of
the law? Life is precious under the common law. The common law has
always protected human life. The principal reason why the case attracted so
much attention is that it involved the killing of a young lad.
One of the most famous sea disasters in America which faced the United
States courts, similar to the Dudley case and those referred to therein, was the
saga of the William Brown.111 Some seventy years before the sinking of the
Titanic, the first American sea disaster took place when the William Brown
sunk off the coast of Massachusetts and many lives were lost.112 The disaster
resulted in much publicity, and Seaman Alexander Holmes was charged with
murder for throwing overboard the men to save the women and children.
On April 19, 1841, the night was cold and the sky black, except for the
sparkling stars. Icebergs dotted the cold Atlantic. The American vessel,
William Brown, quietly sailed the waters some 250 miles southeast of Cape
Race. The ship had left Liverpool the previous March 13. That night predated
by some four score and ten years the sinking of the Titanic. Suddenly the
William Brown was “jolted” when it struck an iceberg.113 The vessel was in
trouble and sank suddenly.
On board were some seventeen crewmembers and sixty-five passengers.114
The captain and crew sprang into action. The captain, the second mate and the
crew lowered a longboat, twenty-two and one-half feet long and two and onehalf feet deep, and a small “jolly” boat.115 The captain, the second mate, seven
of the crew and one passenger slithered into the jolly-boat. The long-boat was
filled with the first mate, eight seamen, and thirty-two passengers. Seaman
Alexander Holmes was in the long-boat. In all forty-one people, men, women,
and children, scurried into the long boat. They were half naked, cold, wet and
“all crowded up together like sheep in a pen.”116 They were shrieking and
calling to the captain in the nearby jolly boat. The mate pleaded “take some of
the passengers in the jolly boat—otherwise we must cast lots and throw some
111. This saga is based on the actual facts of trial. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas.
360 (E.D. Pa. 1842).
112. Id. at 360.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 360.
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overboard.”117 Replying, the captain shouted: “My God, don’t speak of that
now; let it be the last resort.”118 The captain thought to himself, “Poor souls!
You’re going down a short time before we do.”119
The remaining passengers on the William Brown stayed on board and in
one short hour it sunk, with its human cargo, into the eternal sea. Thirty-one
passengers perished.120
The night was Monday, April 18, 1841. The two boats began drifting apart
and soon parted. By Tuesday morning they had lost sight of each other. The
captain’s final words to the passengers in the longboat were orders to obey the
seamen.
When the two boats parted company that Tuesday morning, the long-boat
and all on board were in great jeopardy. The boat began to leak. Even without
a leak it would not have been able to support one-half the people on board. A
cold rain started; the water was icy; the sea grew heavier, the waves splashed
over the bow and the passengers were soaked to the skin. Pieces of ice were
floating all around. The long-boat was sinking.
By late Tuesday night, Seaman Holmes and the rest of the crew had to do
something. The passengers had buckets and tins and, by constant bailing,
reduced the water in the boat so as to make it “hold her own.”121 But the boat
sunk further into the sea. In that dark hour, Holmes and the rest of the crew
began throwing overboard some of the passengers—one at a time—against
their wishes. Fourteen male passengers were literally physically and violently
thrown into the sea. No remarks were made, only a few words were spoken.
Each man quietly accepted his fate. Only the mate called out, as they were
bailing, “This won’t work. Help us, God. The boat is sinking. God, have
mercy on our poor souls.”122 Holmes ordered the crew not to part man and
wife and not to throw over any women. No lots were cast. Only two married
men and a fourteen year-old boy were not cast overboard. Not one of the crew
was thrown into the sea.
Seaman Holmes took charge and was the leader of the crew who threw the
male passengers overboard. The first was John Riley. Holmes told him to
stand up; he did, and Holmes and the other crewmen threw him over.
Afterwards, they did the same to Duffy, who in vain beseeched them to
spare him for the sake of his family. But he too was cast out. Then the crew
seized a third man who told them his wife was in the boat. He was spared.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 361.
Id.
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They then came to Charlie Conlin. Conlin said to Holmes, “Holmes, surely
you won’t put me out.” Holmes replied, “Charlie, you must go, too.”123
Next was Francis Askin. Askin pleaded and offered Holmes five pieces of
gold to spare his life until the next morning, and if no help came then, they
would draw lots. Holmes said, “I don’t want your money, Frank.”124 Holmes
pushed him overboard.
McAvoy was next. He asked for five minutes to say his prayers. He was
granted his request and was thrown over. Two men who tried to hide in the
small boat were next. On and on it went until fourteen were thrown over.
When dawn broke the next morning, the remaining passengers began to
complain that the crew should be made to die the death they chose for the
fourteen. The crew did not heed these complaints. A food check was made:
There were six gallons of water, bread, ten pounds of meat and a bag of
oatmeal. Late in the morning, the weather cleared; and the vessel Crescent in
nearby waters rescued the passengers in the long-boat and all the passengers
and crew remaining in the long boat were saved.
During the course of the whole ordeal, Seaman Holmes was calm and
collected; he parted with his clothes except for undergarments to shelter others;
he tried to raise a quilt for a sail; he saved a young woman who had fallen
overboard and he ordered everyone to be seated while the Crescent was
attempting to rescue them. He told them, “Lie down, every self of you and be
still; if they see so many of us on board, they will steer another way and
pretend they have not seen us.”125 Holmes threw the male passengers
overboard to save the remaining passengers—men, women and a young boy.
If he had not, all would have been lost.
Some months later, Seaman Holmes was charged with “unlawful
homicide” in a federal court in Philadelphia.126 On April 13, 1842, he was
brought to trial—a few days before the anniversary of the calamitous events.
The prosecution was conducted by Mr. William N. Meredith and Mr.
Dallas. Holmes was defended by Mr. David Paul Brown, Mr. Armstrong and
Mr. Hazelhurst. The trial was held before Federal Judge Baldwin.127
At the beginning of the case, Judge Baldwin noticed a great number of
newspaper reporters in the courtroom. He told the reporters that by an Act of
Congress, adopted in 1831, the Court no longer had the power to punish as
contempt the publication of testimony of a trial.128 But, he told them that since
the Court had the power to regulate the admission of persons within the bar,
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the Court “takes this occasion to state that no person or reporter will be
allowed to come within the bar for the purpose of reporting, except on the
condition that they will suspend all publication until after the trial is
concluded.”129 The reporter expressed their acquiescence in this order of the
court, and the “most respectful silence prevailed during the whole trial.”130
Mr. Dallas argued the case for the prosecution. He argued that Holmes
was charged with “unlawful homicide.”131 He said that Holmes’ defense
would be that the homicides were necessary to preserve the lives of all the
others. But Dallas added:
Was the danger instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice or means, leaving no
moment for deliberations? For, unless the dangers were of this sort, the
prisoner had no right to sacrifice the lives of sixteen fellow human beings
without notice, without consultation or without drawing lots. Peril, even
extreme peril, is not enough to justify a sacrifice such as this.132

Mr. Dallas continued:
No man may take away his brother’s life, except in self-defense. No law gives
a crew; no law gives Holmes the right to decide life and death; we do not give
a seaman the power to make jettison of human beings, or making them mere
cargo. We do not allow sailors and American seaman to throw overboard,
whomsoever they may choose, for their own safety or even for the safety of
others. Holmes believed that the ultimate safety of the majority was at stake,
then it was his duty to give notice to all on board or draw lots.133

When Mr. Dallas had finished, Mr. Armstrong rose in defense of Holmes.
[Your honor, gentlemen of the jury,] . . . This case should be tried in that longboat, sunk down to its very gunwale, with forty-one half naked, starved and
shivering wretches the boat leaking from below, filling from above, a hundred
leagues from land, at midnight, surrounded by ice and subject to certain
destruction for the change of the most changeful of the elements, the winds and
the waves. To those add the horrors of famine and despair, madness and all
the prospects, of this unutterable condition.134

After the arguments, Judge Baldwin charged the jury. He told the jury that
the law divides homicides into murder and manslaughter.
The jurors listened attentively to the Judge. He spoke slowly and
deliberately. The lawyers and the prisoner sat quietly at the table. The judge
continued in an unemotional manner.
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On shipboard, the passenger stands in a different position from that of the
officers and seamen. It is the sailor who must encounter the hardships and
perils of the voyage. This relation is not changed when the ship is lost by
tempest or other danger of the sea, and all on board are beside themselves.
Imminence of danger cannot absolve from duty. The sailor is bound to
undergo whatever hazard is necessary to preserve the boat and the passengers.
Should the emergency become so extreme as to call for the sacrifice of life,
there can be no reason why the law does not still remain the same. The
passenger, not being bound either to labor or to incur the risk of life, cannot be
bound to sacrifice his existence to preserve the sailor’s. But the seaman in
charge of the boat, such as Holmes, and a sufficient number of seamen to
navigate the boat must be preserved; for without them to navigate all will
perish. However, the sailors and passengers, in fact, cannot be regarded as in
equal positions. The sailor owes more benevolence to another than himself.
He is bound to set a greater value on the life of others than on his own. And
while it is the law that seamen may lawfully struggle with each other for a
plank which can save but one, we think that, if the passenger is on the plank,
even ‘the law of necessity’ does not justify the sailor to take it from him. This
rule may be deemed a harsh one towards the sailor who may have thus far
done his duty, but when the danger is so extreme, that the only hope is in
sacrificing either a sailor or a passenger, any alternative is hard; and it would
be the hardest of any to sacrifice a passenger in order to save a sailor.135

After a few remarks upon the evidence, the case was given to the jury, and
sixteen hours afterwards, and after having once returned to the bar unable to
agree, the jury found a verdict of guilty. Holmes, however, was recommended
to the mercy of the Court.136
On a Motion to Overturn the Verdict, the Court held the motion under
advisement for some days and then overruled it. The Judge in his order
overruling the motion said, “Notwithstanding all that has been said, no error
has been perceived by the Court in its instructions to the jury.”137 “It is true,”
said the Court,
as is known by every one, that we do find in the text writers and sometimes in
judicial opinion, the phrase, ‘the law of nature,’ the ‘principles of natural
right,’ and other expressions of the like; but, as applied to civilized men,
nothing more can be meant by those expressions than that there are certain
great and fundamental principles of justice which, in the constitution of nature,
lie at the foundation and are made part of all civil law, independently of
express adoption or enactment. And to give these expressions any other
significance, to claim them as showing an independent code, and one contrary
to those settled principles, which however modified, make a part of civil law in
all Christian nations, would be to make the writers who use the expression lay
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down as rules of action, principles which admit of no practical ascertainment
or application.138

When Holmes was brought before the Court for sentencing, the Judge said
to him that many circumstances in the dreadful affair were of a character to
commend him, yet the case was one in which some punishment was
demanded; that it was in the power of the Court to inflict the penalty of an
imprisonment for a term of three years and a fine of $1000, but in view of all
the circumstances, and especially as Holmes had already been confined several
months, the Court would make the punishment more lenient. Holmes was then
sentenced to solitary confinement in the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania,
at hard labor, for the term of six months, and was ordered to pay a fine of
$20.139
During the course of the trial and afterwards, considerable sympathy was
excited in favor of Holmes by the press; an effort was made by several persons,
and particularly by the Seamen’s Friend Society, to obtain a pardon from
President Tyler, but the President refused to grant a pardon.140
The importance of the past events in the centuries before the incident on
the Mignonette is that Dudley and the others, and indeed society, had
precedents on what to do in an emergency situation on the high seas to
sacrifice one in order to save the lives of others—a dangerous societal practice.
The belief and myth was, at the time, that it was proper, moral and legal to
sacrifice one to save many. Dudley knew what must be done; someone had to
die so that the others might live. They knew how to obtain human blood to
survive; they knew that living blood was vital. They knew the appropriate
course of action was to draw lots. They knew that in times past, the emergency
or necessity, at least in myth and folklore, permitted the killing of Parker to
save their own lives. The custom of the sea, as well as other incidents on land,
seemed to permit, or at least ignore, the practice of sacrificing one to save
others. But could such a practice of killing and sacrificing a human being be
authorized by law? Could the common law—that great tradition of protecting
and placing the highest value on human life—legitimize such a practice? Such
legitimacy would be a dangerous matter for society.
No case before Dudley except the Holmes case had gone to court. The
1880s were a time when civilization flowered. It would be difficult to condone
a practice, whether on the high seas or not, of sacrificing a fellow human being
to save others outside a context of war.
For the peace and dignity of the realm, therefore, it was essential that some
affirmative, clear cut official ruling be made by the highest judges in England
to put the Dudley matter of the practice at rest. That is why it was essential for
138. Id. at 369.
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the Home Office, and for civilized society, to put Dudley and Stephens on trial.
The Home Office was frustrated in earlier attempts to legally determine the
custom of the sea in these cases, hence it was essential now that a clear-cut
case was presented to obtain a definitive ruling on the issues of life and death
on the high seas—which would be precedential for other similar situations.
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